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THE TRAGEDY OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
(AND A COMMON SENSE PROPOSAL)
MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN
REVIEWED BY ALAN HIRSCH*
DNA testing has unveiled the unthinkable about American criminal
justice: innocent persons are convicted with some frequency.l More dis-
turbing still, this sometimes happens because of faulty evidence assumed to
be nearly infallible: a defendant's confession. 2
Perhaps we shouldn't be surprised. For some time now, experts have
warned that false confessions occur surprisingly often. 3 However, because
it seems so counterintuitive that an innocent person would confess to a
crime absent physical or extreme psychological coercion, some com-
mentators remain skeptical and resist reforms designed to reduce false
confessions.
4
To overcome such resistance, a good story may be worth a thousand
essays and social science experiments. Enter Margaret Edds' AN EXPEND-
ABLE MAN, 5 the riveting story of Earl Washington, who came within days
of execution for a rape and murder he did not commit. Washington spent
*Professor of Legal Studies, Williams College. J.D., Yale Law School.
1. See Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, DNA and Innocence Scholarship, in WRONGLY
CONVICTED 241 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (noting 82 cases of
post-conviction DNA exonerations as of October 2000). See http://www.innocenceproject.com,
(last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (providing the current number of convicts exonerated by DNA
evidence).
2. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 92 (2000) ("Among DNA exonerations
studied by the Innocence Project, 23 percent of the convictions were based on false confessions or
admissions."). See also Richard Leo & Richard Ofsche, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88
J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (discussing false confessions generally and specifically,
60 cases of confessions either proven false or deemed likely to be false by the authors); Albert
Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 973 n. 78 (1997) (stating that
cases of known false confessions are "no more than the tip of an iceberg.").
3. See, e.g., SAUL KASSIN & LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM
2-3 (1993).
4. See, e.g., Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (2001); Paul Cassell, Balanced Approaches To The False Confession
Problem: A Brief Comment On Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1123 (1997).
5. MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN (New York University Press) (2003).
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more than 17 years in Virginia prisons, much of it on death row, before
receiving a gubernatorial pardon.6
Edds' account of Washington's odyssey is a rarity: a true-crime and
courtroom drama that handles legal issues with clarity and sophistication.
The saga suffers from no shortage of heroes and villains. The heroes in-
clude Washington himself, a mildly retarded man who remained upbeat in
the face of the ultimate injustice, and his committed legal team which
maintained faith and persistence in the face of countless courtroom defeats.
The villains include an array of lawyers and judges, starting with Williams'
own trial lawyer.
The case against Washington was based almost exclusively on his re-
canted, error-riddled confession. As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit would later note, the confession "contained numerous
original factual errors- including the race of the victim, the injury inflicted,
the non-presence of any others at the crime scene (two children were
present), and the location of the victim's apartment." 7 In addition, "expert
medical opinion ... [was offered] that he was highly suggestible, 'easily
led,' that 'out of his need to please he relies on cues given by others and
reflexive affability. '8
Washington's trial attorney failed to drive home the weakness of the
case. Most egregiously, he never introduced key exculpatory evidence:
seminal fluid found inside the victim that did not match the defendant's
blood type (and did match the blood type of one of the original suspects in
the case). 9 This, of course, is a familiar story: the indigent defendant re-
ceiving poor representation from inexperienced counsel. A somewhat less
familiar but equally important story is the lazy or stubborn judge who
allows the defendant to be railroaded. A few such judges played a role in
the Earl Washington tragedy, none more disturbing than that of Dickson
Phillips Jr., ironically one of the most liberal members of the Fourth Circuit
(which, admittedly, is like being one of the more conservative members of
the ACLU). 10
The case reached the Fourth Circuit on review of denial of habeas
corpus.lI Washington's arguments included a powerful claim of ineffective
6. Edds, supra note 5, at 5-6.
7. Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1478 n.5 (4th Cir. 1991).
8. Id.
9. See Edds, supra note 5, at 60, 64 (discussing some of the egregious errors made by
Washington's trial attorney); id. at 102-03 (discussing the discovery of the seminal fluid not
matching Washington's).
10. See id. at 114.
11. Seeid. at Ill.
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assistance of counsel based primarily on the aforementioned failure to intro-
duce crucial scientific evidence. 12 The Fourth Circuit recognized that this
appeared to be a clear case of ineffective assistance, 13 and further recog-
nized that the case against Washington was weak.14 The court remanded
the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the apparent
ineffective assistance was indeed ineffective and whether it prejudiced the
defendant.15 But the court opinion made this seem like a formality. How
could it possibly not be ineffective assistance to ignore key exculpatory evi-
dence? How could such error not warrant reversal in a case that was weak
to begin with?
16
Yet, when the case returned to the Fourth Circuit two years later, the
court viewed the matter very differently-with Judge Phillips flipping and
joining a majority opinion wildly at odds with the court's initial opinion.17
On remand, the trial court (allegedly caught dozing during a key moment of
testimony)18 had found that, because the allegedly exculpatory evidence
was not conclusive or unrebutted, it would not have swayed the jury. 19 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed, thus rejecting the ineffective assistance claim and
keeping Earl Washington on death row.20
A comparison between the Fourth Circuit's two opinions is unsettling.
When the court initially heard the case, it recognized that, even without the
12. See id. at 117; see also Murray, 952 F.2d at 1476.
13. See Murray, 952 F.2d at 1477 ("On this state of the record, the district court could not
properly conclude as a matter of law, without an evidentiary hearing, that counsel's conduct as
alleged in Washington's petition fell within the range of reasonable professional conduct.").
14. See id. (stating that the probative evidence that was not presented by Washington's trial
attorney could have created a reasonable doubt sufficient to acquit Washington).
15. Id. at 1485.
16. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (demonstrating that to estab-
lish ineffective assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and there was a "reasonable probability" that it affected the
outcome).
17. Edds, supra note 5, at 127.
18. Id. at 122, 126.
19. Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285, 1286-88 (4th Cir. 1993). In addition, the trial court
had found that the failure to introduce the exculpatory evidence was a reasonable "strategic
decision" by his attorney. This odd suggestion was dismissed by the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 1289.
20. Id. at 1292. At the evidentiary hearing, two forensics experts testified that semen stains
could not have been left by Washington. Edds, supra note 5, at 122-24. However, under cross-
examination they acknowledged the theoretical possibility that the stains could have been left by
the victim's husband during an earlier sexual encounter and this, mixed with the victim's
secretions, could have "masked" the defendant's semen. Murray, 4 F.3d at 1290. The stain did
not match the husband's blood type either, but could have mixed with vaginal fluid and masked
his blood type. Id. No evidence supported this conjecture, but it was a theoretical possibility. Be-
cause the evidence did not necessarily exonerate the defendant, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding that there was no "reasonable probability" that such evidence would have
led the jury to a different conclusion. Id. at 1289.
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exculpatory scientific evidence, the prosecution's case was flimsy. 21 Now,
viewing the identical record, the court found "a strong case against peti-
tioner."22 Whereas its initial opinion cited major errors in the confession,23
the second time around the court offered possible (albeit strained) expla-
nations for the errors.24 In its initial opinion, the court noted that the
evidence consisted "essentially" of the confession, and described the ex-
treme weakness in the only other putative evidence-a shirt found at the
crime scene.25 In the second opinion, the court simply stated that Wash-
ington's confessions were "corroborated [by] his admitted ownership of a
shirt linked to the crime scene" 26 and made no mention of the serious prob-
lems with this evidence. 27
How could Judge Phillips join each of these divergent opinions? It is
theoretically possible, of course, that faced with new briefs, an opportunity
to revisit the record, and the benefits of the evidentiary hearing, he simply
took a different view of the evidence. But Phillips himself offers a different
explanation for his flip-flop. Years later, after a more sophisticated DNA
test conclusively established that the seminal fluid was not Washington's,
Phillips claimed that "my intuition was that there was something very, very
wrong about the case in the first place." 28 However, after the trial court
found the exculpatory evidence inconclusive, Phillips "felt compelled to
21. See Murray, 952 F.2d at 1479 (stating that though evidence was technically sufficient to
support conviction, "it is not without real, as opposed to merely fanciful, problems for any fair
minded jury asked ... to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
22. Murray, 4 F.3d at 1290.
23. Murray, 952 F.2d at 1481.
24. See Murray, 4 F.3d at 1290-91 (purporting to explain the initial errors in the case). For
example, Washington had testified that he stabbed the victim two or three times, whereas the
victim was actually stabbed 38 times. Id. at 1291 n.4. Washington had testified that no one was
present, whereas two children were present. Id. The court posited that Washington may have been
too embarrassed to state these facts accurately. Id. The court had no such explanation for Wash-
ington stating the wrong race of the victim, but pointed out that he subsequently changed his
mind. Id.
25. Murray, 952 F.2d at 1477-78.
26. Murray, 4 F.3d at 1290.
27. See Murray, 4 F.3d at 1293 (Butzner, J., dissenting). Judge Butzner's dissent points out
that
in a thorough, investigative search of the crime scene the shirt was not discovered.
The victim's mother-in-law found it in a dresser draw that contained clothes belonging
to the victim and her husband ... . The laboratory report shows that hairs in the shirt
were consistent with the hair of [the original suspect]. When defense counsel
requested comparison with Washington's facial hair, the request was denied.
Washington's sister, who laundered his clothes, testified that the shirt was not his.
Id. Note, too, that the defendant (who had an I.Q. of 69, roughly that of a 10 year old boy) did not
volunteer information about the shirt. Edds, supra note 5, at 118. He was shown the shirt and
assented when asked-perhaps very suggestively-if it was his. Id.
28. Edds, supra note 5, at 129 (quoting Brooke A. Masters, Missteps On Road To Justice; In
Va., Innocent Man Was Nearly Executed, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 1, 2000, at A- 1).
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uphold [those] findings."29 Had he followed his intuition, and his colleague
Judge John Butzner, whose dissent cogently outlined flaws in the trial
court's findings, Earl Washington would have been a free man years earlier.
Sadly, Judge Phillips' behavior is not the most disturbing in this trag-
edy. That dubious distinction belongs to the prosecutors, who arguably
never should have gone forward with such a shaky case. Apart from the
many inconsistencies noted above, Washington's confession never made
much sense. He said he was driven to the crime scene by two unidentified
people, whose motivation for transporting him was never made clear,
whose actions during and after the alleged crime were never probed, and
who were never located or heard from again. 30 Moreover, the prosecutors
knew that Washington was a mentally retarded man whose confession was
wrong on critical details, such as the race of the victim (though, under
prodding, he corrected himself), and who also confessed to a string of
crimes that he couldn't possibly have committed.
3 1
Moreover, they knew about the seminal fluid, and never mentioned it at
trial. True, they complied with their legal obligations by turning over the
relevant reports to the defense, 32 then silently accepted their good fortune
when the defense failed to appreciate that these reports contained crucial
evidence. When forced to confront this evidence at the evidentiary hearing
ordered by the Fourth Circuit, the prosecution came up with the theory
noted above: the seminal fluid belonged to the victim's husband.33 This
failed to explain why none of Washington's seminal fluid or DNA was
found at the crime scene.
When further DNA testing conclusively ruled out Washington as the
source of the seminal fluid, the prosecution did not flinch. They merely
changed their theory of the case, arguing that Washington was not the rapist
but an accomplice. 34 This new theory suggested that the victim was mis-
taken in her dying declaration that only one man was present. Moreover, it
29. Id.
30. Id. at 40.
31. See id. at 40-44. Indeed, they dropped the charges with respect to his many other
confessions. Id. at 44. In fairness to the prosecutors, Washington clearly had committed one
crime-breaking into a home and wounding an elderly woman-shortly before the rape/murder
and other crimes to which he falsely confessed. The crime, triggered by a combustible mix of
poverty, depravity, alcohol, and a family argument, seems the single blemish on the record of a
man everyone regarded as kind and benign. But, as Margaret Edds fully understands, circum-
stances explain without excusing. She does not downplay Washington's actual crime, or the pos-
sibility that it might mitigate the injustice of his punishment for a crime he did not commit.
32. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963) (holding that prosecution must
disclose to the defense all potentially exculpatory evidence).
33. See supra note 20.
34. Id. at 140-41.
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meant that Washington's confession-the only real evidence against
him-was also fundamentally erroneous. In other words, the prosecutors
were convinced of one thing and one thing only: somehow or other, Earl
Washington was guilty. That was their story and they stuck to it, even after
Washington's pardon.35
In the concluding chapter of AN EXPENDABLE MAN, Margaret Edds
mentions several policy reforms that would reduce the likelihood of future
tragedies: videotaping confessions; selection of better defense counsel in
capital cases and greater expert resources available to them; post-conviction
DNA testing; relaxing rules barring newly-discovered evidence in post-
conviction challenges; and assistance for mentally retarded persons during
interrogations. 36 Such proposals will not surprise those acquainted with the
literature on criminal justice reform. But there's another reform whose
need is powerfully suggested by the Earl Washington saga, a proposal not
made by Edds or anyone else to date, that can and should be immediately
adopted.
A MODEST PROPOSAL
The behavior of the prosecutors in the Earl Washington case is
disturbingly common. In many cases where DNA testing exonerates per-
sons wrongly convicted of crimes because they confessed, prosecutors re-
fuse to acknowledge the innocence of the defendant and resist his release. 37
In some of these cases (like the Washington case), the resistance is
absurd,38 with prosecutors shifting to a new theory unsupported by the
35. Id. at 199.
36. Id. at 196-212.
37. See generally Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, After Exonerations, Hunt For Killer Rare;
Police, Prosecutors Cling to Original Theories, Seldom Pursue New Leads, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27,
2003. For examples of particular cases of prosecutors refusing to accept DNA exonerations
subsequent to confessions, see also Bob Herbert. Getting Away With .... , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2004, at A-17 (case of Darryl Hunt); Robbin Topping & Chau Lam, Despite DNA, Case
Continues; New Trial For Man Freed In Rape-Murder, NEWSDAY, Sept. 12, 2003, at A-8 (John
Kogut); Carlos Sadovi, Two Men Freed After Judge Orders New Trial in '76 Murder, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, May 24, 2003, at 6 (Paul Terry and Michael Evans); Sara Rimer, DNA Testing In Rape
Cases Frees Prisoner After 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A-12 (Bruce Godshalk); Eric
Herman, Conspiracy Theory, AM. LAWYER, March 1998, 74 (Reynaldo Cruz and Alejandro
Hernandez); PAUL MONES, STALKING JUSTICE (1995) (David Vasquez); Sheck et al., supra note
2, at 78-87, 92-106 (Robert Miller); Steven Drizin & Beth Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll:
Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is The Solution to Illinois Problem of False
Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 337, 361-62 (2001) (Ronald Jones); TERRY GANEY, INNOCENT
BLOOD: A TRUE STORY OF TERROR AND JUSTICE 227 (1989) (Melvin Reynolds).
38. See, e.g., Drizin & Colgan, supra note 37, at 347 (stating that Illinois law enforcement
authorities have "failed to acknowledge the innocence of defendants even where scientific
evidence has proven their innocence, where evidence shows it was physically impossible for the




evidence.39 Without the prosecution's cooperation, the defendant remains
incarcerated for long periods while the case winds its way through the
bureaucracy until a court order, re-trial, or governor's pardon finally results
in vindication and freedom.
This phenomenon reflects several factors. First, like everyone else
inside and outside the criminal justice system, prosecutors find it counter-
intuitive that an innocent person would confess. 40 Thus, prosecutors "al-
most never consider the possibility that they may be prosecuting an
innocent defendant based on a police-induced false confession," 4' and when
a defendant recants the confession, "prosecutors dismiss the recantation
with sneering derision."42
But there are particular factors at work as well. Many district attorneys
are ambitious, and may fear that admitting they put away someone innocent
will prove damaging to their political prospects. More importantly, prose-
cutors, like all people, have a powerful need to rationalize: those who put
people behind bars cannot easily admit-to themselves or others-such
egregious error.4 3
A relatively simple solution suggests itself. When a credible case of
DNA exoneration is made, responsibility for the defendant should auto-
matically be transferred to a different office from that which prosecuted
him.a4
The proposal does not entail automatically freeing anyone who appears
exonerated by DNA. The new prosecutor will want confirmation of the
DNA results, and should probe the confession for internal or other external
evidence that will refute or corroborate it. A true confession often includes
information known only to the culprit or, better still, leads the police to new
information. By contrast, a false confession is often internally inconsistent
or uninformative-it spits back information supplied by the interrogators or
39. See Edds, supra note 5, at 199 (noting tendency of prosecutors to make "wildly
improbable adjustments" to their theory of the case following apparent DNA exoneration).
40. See, e.g., Rimer, supra note 37, at A-12 (explaining that even after multiple DNA tests
cleared the defendant, the District Attorney maintained serious doubts about the defendant's
innocence because he has "no reason to doubt the validity of the confession."); Scheck et al.,
supra note 2, at 93 (stating that the prosecutor remained unconvinced because "'the DNA tests do
not erase the statements given by Mr. Miller himself concerning these crimes."').
41. Leo & Ofsche, supra note 2, at 45.
42. Id.
43. See Ganey, supra note 37, at 227 ("'You can imagine the difficulty I had convincing
myself that Melvin Reynolds didn't commit the crime.' Insco said later. 'I was the one that
prosecuted Reynolds ... I was reluctant to believe it."'); Edds, supra note 5, at 199 ("In the
Washington case, as in others, many of those invested in the original conviction maintain their
belief in its accuracy").
44. Consideration might also be given to creating a special prosecutor to handle these cases.
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known to the public. In addition, various factors (such as young or men-
tally impaired suspects, a lengthy interrogation, and threats or promises by
the police) increase the likelihood of a false confession.4 5
In assessing the evidence, the new prosecutor will have to deal with his
own intuition that innocent people don't confess. But the fact that DNA ev-
idence appears to have exonerated the defendant, coupled with knowledge
that false confessions have turned out to be more frequent than anyone
imagined, should create a healthy skepticism about the confession.46 Criti-
cally, the new prosecutor can evaluate the matter with a clear head and
conscience, unburdened by past association with the case and any need to
rationalize his involvement in it.47
Legislators should give the matter serious attention, and prosecutors
can begin to utilize the proposed measure without waiting for adoption of a
formal rule. The proposal is neither costly nor difficult to implement, and
would immediately help reduce one of the worst imaginable tragedies:
punishment of the innocent.
In the meantime, legislators, members of the legal profession, and all
others interested in criminal justice should treat themselves to AN
EXPENDABLE MAN. Earl Washington's tragic story, as it unfolds in this
richly textured book, inspires both outrage at human folly and awe of the
human spirit. Maybe it can inspire desperately needed reform as well.
45. See, e.g., Welsh White, False Confessions And The Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 142-53 (1997).
46. It may be argued that no such skepticism is in order, for the prosecutor is an advocate
whose job is to represent the People. But, in fact, it has long been accepted that prosecutors are
not simply advocates, but serve a "quasi-judicial" function. See Roberta Howers, What You see Is
What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REv.
699, 728-733 (1998). This, at times, entails that "the prosecutor must protect not only her own
case, but her opponent's as well." Id. at 731. As the Supreme Court has made clear, prosecutors
must be as concerned that the innocent not be punished as that the guilty not escape punishment.
See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
47. See Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (assessing the propriety of a particular
prosecutor or judge's involvement in a case requires "a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness").
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